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Abstract 
 
Laughter is a phenomenon that occurs in a variety of contexts and has effects at social, cognitive, 
and physiological levels.  Laughter is linked to positive emotions, which have been theorized to 
broaden thought-action repertoires and build social and psychological resources; however, few 
studies have examined the effects of laughter in an experimental manner.  In times of anxiety, 
people could especially benefit from more flexible thoughts and increased social and 
psychological resources, and laughter may be a useful tool in the psychological arsenal.  In this 
study, I attempt to use laughter as an intervention to reduce anxiety after the induction of an 
anxious state.  I compare the effects of genuine laughter to the effects of another positive state, 
relaxation, as well as to a forced laughter condition and a control condition without an 
intervention, on subjective ratings of anxiety and cognitions.  Although laughter was not found to 
affect self-reported ratings of anxiety, it did significantly lessen the degree of negative thoughts 
regarding the anxiety-provoking situation compared to the other three conditions.  Genuine 
laughter also reduced implicit attentional bias toward social threat compared to the control 
condition, as measured by an emotional Stroop task.  Future research could extend this finding 
by exploring the utility of laughter in a therapeutic setting with clinically anxious clients, as 
anxiety disorders are characterized by an attentional bias to perceived threat and inflexible, 
negative cognitions about situations or objects that are found threatening.  Using laughter along 
with traditional cognitive-behavioral therapy might increase treatment success rates and overall 
client well-being. 
 Keywords: laughter, anxiety, attentional bias  
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Laughter as a Buffer for Negative Thoughts in Anxiety-Provoking Situations 
Anxiety disorders are characterized by a misevaluation of and distorted beliefs about the 
danger of external or internal stimuli (Clark, 1999) and may also be linked with an attentional 
bias toward perceived threat (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985).  Individuals with anxiety disorders 
are typically treated with cognitive-behavioral therapy in order to address the inappropriate 
thoughts and behaviors that arise in those with an anxiety disorder.  Making clients aware of 
their bias toward threat and retraining them to focus on less-threatening stimuli is a component 
of cognitive-behavioral therapy.  What cognitive-behavioral therapy lacks is a broader effect on 
the emotional well-being of those treated, beyond the reduction of anxiety.   
In addition to a cognitive understanding of anxiety disorders, recent research suggests 
that problems with the ability to regulate emotions may also be an underlying factor in anxiety 
(Kring & Werner, 2004).  People who experience social anxiety, which is characterized by 
increased vigilance toward perceived social threat and increased attention to oneself (Clark & 
Wells, 1995), especially struggle with emotional reactivity and emotion dysregulation.  They fear 
the disapproval of others in social situations and make negative evaluations of their self-worth.  
The prevalence of social anxiety in the United States is about 2.8% over a one year period, or 5% 
over a lifetime (Grant, et al., 2005); however, many people also experience sub-clinical anxiety 
in social situations on a regular basis.  Thirty-three percent of adults in one sample reported 
excessive anxiety in response to public-speaking (Stein, Walker, & Forde, 1996).  Thus, while 
research on social anxiety is critical for clinical populations, there are also potential wide-ranging 
benefits for non-clinical populations.  For example, according to a study conducted with anxious 
youth, cognitive-behavioral therapy improved emotion regulation for worry, but not general 
emotion regulation ability (Suveg, Sood, Comer, & Kendall, 2009).  Emotion regulation 
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techniques emphasize control and appropriate expression of negative emotions but largely ignore 
the possible impact of increasing feelings and expressions of positive emotions.  Expanding the 
current approach to emotion regulation by focusing on a wider range of emotions could benefit 
anxious populations.   
According to the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions, emotions such as joy, 
interest, contentment, pride, love, and amusement enable a person to function more effectively in 
two steps.  First, positive emotions broaden in-the-moment thought-action repertoires, which 
increase creativity and the flexibility of thoughts (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).  Second, 
positive emotions build psychological and social resources over time, beyond the present 
emotional experience.  Positive emotions increase psychological resilience and increase 
emotional well-being (Fredrickson, 2001).  Experiencing positive emotions on a regular basis 
allows people to go beyond ritualized thinking in the moment and manage future threats with an 
increased store of social and physiological resources, which allow them to cope with their 
problems and experience an upward, rather than a downward, spiral (Fredrickson & Joiner, 
2002).  Although all positive emotions have this effect, I hypothesize that laughter, a marker of 
the positive emotion of exhilaration (the emotional response to humor, also called amusement or 
mirth; Ruch, 1990), will have a stronger effect on anxiety than other positive emotions.  Laughter 
affects an individual psychologically, socially, cognitively, and physiologically. As an active 
behavior that occurs along with positive emotions, laughter might have a greater effect than the 
experience of positive emotions alone.  The present study is designed to address the current lack 
of experimental evidence that laughter can reduce state anxiety and increase psychological 
resources for distressed individuals. 
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Laughter is not only a sign of exhilaration, but it also tends to lead to further exhilaration, 
especially in social settings.  It is important to note that laughter does not always occur as a result 
of humor; the author of one study found that 80% of conversational laughter occurred outside of 
humorous contexts (Provine, 2001).  From an evolutionary perspective, laughter is a 
communicative signal.  Known as the safety signal hypothesis, laughter developed as an outward 
display of emotion that lets others know that the intent of the action it accompanies is not 
aggressive (Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1997).  Evidence for an evolutionary theory of laughter can 
be found in primate studies that examine precursors to laughter among apes, including the open-
mouthed, panting “play-face” (Ross, Owren, & Zimmermann, 2009; Preuschoft & van Hooff, 
1997).  Laughing people are rated by others as more likeable (Reysen, 2006), and thus a person 
who laughs often builds social resources.  Shared laughter, laughter that occurs between two or 
more individuals in a social situation, is tied to factors like social support and group cohesion.  
Although the social effects and benefits of laughter are important, in this study, I attempt to 
isolate the phenomena of laughter in the individual, in order to examine its cognitive and 
emotional effects without confounding these effects with those of social support.  People usually 
laugh in a social context, but laughter can be studied experimentally in individuals, not just in 
pairs or groups, and it has been induced in the laboratory in an individual context (Petridis, 
Martinez, & Pantic, in press). 
 It is worthwhile to examine the specific mechanisms of laughter, instead of studying 
laughter as an incidental side effect of a positive emotion.  Laughter has effects on physiology, 
cognition, behavior, and social interactions.  Although laughter is a social tool, its effects are not 
merely communicative or conciliatory.  It has been hypothesized that when people laugh, they 
temporarily distance themselves from distress in a form of mild dissociation (Keltner & 
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Bonanno, 1997).  Perhaps they might be able to break the cycle of negative thoughts by moving 
themselves away from a distressing memory, event, or pattern of thoughts.  This psychological 
benefit of laughter has some support from a study that found a negative correlation between 
genuine laughter and perceived suffering after the loss of a loved one (Keltner & Bonanno, 
1997).  However, further experimental research using a broader sample is needed to examine the 
connection between laughter and reduced distress.  Instead of looking at overall patterns of 
humor preference or trait cheerfulness, laughter must be examined on-line in stressful situations 
in order to pinpoint specific effects. 
One other important factor to consider is that only genuine laughter, which is 
accompanied by positive emotions, is thought to produce the psychological effects described 
above.  Different researchers have used different manners of distinguishing genuine from forced 
laughter, although there is typically much overlap.  Keltner and Bonanno (1997) found a 
significant correlation only between Duchenne laughter (which involves orbicularis oculi muscle 
movement), reduced distress, and increased positive emotions.  Other research suggests that 
voicing and tonality are characteristics of genuine laughter, as laughs with these characteristics 
more readily elicit positive affective responses in listeners (Bachorowski & Owren, 2001).  
Keltner and Bonanno compared Duchenne and non-Duchenne laughter in their study, but the 
correlational nature of their work means that genuine laughter and positive emotions might not 
be factors that contribute to a reduction of distress.  Experimental evidence is needed to 
demonstrate conclusively that genuine laughter reduces distress more effectively than forced 
laughter. 
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Present Study 
 In this study, I aim to look at the effects of laughter on an individual, specifically in its 
ability to buffer the emotional and cognitive effects of anxiety.  After inducing a social stressor, I 
will compare the pre- and post-stressor anxiety levels of four groups: a group that experiences 
genuine laughter, a group that engages in forced laughter, a group that experiences relaxation (a 
more passive positive emotion), and a control group.  I hypothesize that participants who engage 
in genuine laughter will experience a greater decrease in self-ratings of anxiety than participants 
who laugh without a humorous stimulus, engage in relaxation, or experience no intervention 
condition. 
In order to see changes in anxiety over time, I will induce anxiety in the laboratory in a 
non-clinical population sample, using a speech preparation task.  In previous experiments, a 
speech preparation task has significantly increased baseline anxiety ratings and physiological 
responses, even in non-clinically anxious participants (Mauss, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2003).  After 
this task, I will assess differences in attentional bias among the groups.  In a typical response 
pattern, participants show slower response times for words related to social anxiety compared 
with other words, which indicates increased attention toward anxiety-related words.  However, I 
hypothesize that participants who engage in genuine laughter will show a smaller difference in 
reaction time between social anxiety words and control words than participants in the other three 
conditions. 
Method 
Participants 
115 participants from the Psychology 101 Participant Pool at the University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill were recruited to participate in this study.  Participants were excluded 
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during recruitment if they were under 18 for consent purposes.  Participants were also excluded 
during recruitment if they were pregnant or had a known heart condition, to reduce aberrant 
physiological data.  Data from one participant, who withdrew during the experiment, was 
excluded.  Nine other participants were excluded due to procedural error, including problems 
with following directions, skipping parts of the experiment crucial to the planned analyses, and 
computer problems.  This exclusion left a remainder of 105 participants with usable data.  Of 
these participants, 70.5% were female, 33.3% were non-white, and 7.6% were Hispanic or 
Latino/a.   
Apparatus 
 Several physiological measures were collected continuously throughout the experiment, 
although they were not used in the final analysis.  Continuous noninvasive blood pressure was 
monitored with the CNAP Monitor 500, using a cuff placed on the upper left arm and a double-
finger cuff on the index and middle fingers of the left hand.  All other measurements were 
collected using a BioNex chassis, accessories, and software.  Respiratory measurement was 
conducted using MindWare BioNex pl500 Respiration Belt with Pulse Lock.  An 
electrocardiogram was measured using three MindWare ECG electrodes placed on the torso 
according to machine instructions.  Galvanic skin conductance was measured using MindWare 
GSR electrodes placed on the palm of the participant’s right hand. 
 Participants were videotaped via two cameras, one aimed at their face to monitor facial 
expression and the other aimed at their hands and computer screen.  The experimenter used this 
second video feed in order to monitor participant progress through the experiment and intervene 
if necessary in order to provide clarifying instructions, in an attempt to minimize procedural 
errors.  Videos were collected using Noldus Observer XT software. 
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Procedure 
 The experiment consisted of a single laboratory session that lasted between 45 and 60 
minutes.  After setup of the above apparatus, the experimenter brought the participant into the 
laboratory.  The experimenter then showed the equipment to the participant and briefly explained 
the overall procedure, informing participants that they would be completing tasks and answering 
questionnaires on a computer, while physiological measures were taken throughout the 
experiment.  Participants consented to the study and agreed to be videotaped.  After answering 
any questions, the experimenter began to set up the equipment with the participant according to 
the description above. 
 Initial questionnaires and baseline measurements.  In the first section of the 
experiment, participants were left alone to fill out questionnaires assessing trait characteristics, 
including measures of anxiety, cheerfulness, resilience, and personality factors.  When 
participants reached a stop sign in the questionnaire, they signaled at the camera that they were 
finished.  At that time, the experimenter re-entered the participant room.  The experimenter 
instructed the participant to “relax and clear your mind” for five minutes, in order to establish 
baseline physiological measures. Participants were given a pair of headphones to wear during 
this time to block out excessive background noise.  After leaving the participant to sit and relax 
for five minutes, the experimenter again entered the participant room and gave the participant 
instructions to continue with the survey, following all directions as given in audio instructions 
played over headphones.  Headphones were also used to prevent the experimenter from knowing 
to which condition the participant was assigned. 
Performance task.  Participants listened to an audio file containing instructions to 
prepare and give a speech entitled “Why are you a good friend?”  Participants had two minutes 
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to mentally prepare a five minute speech on this topic, and were told they would be videotaped 
and evaluated based on their clarity, coherence, and persuasiveness.  The audio file allowed for 
two minutes of silent preparation, then instructed participants to continue with the survey to 
receive further instructions.  This speech paradigm was taken from Tugade and Fredrickson 
(2004) and was designed to increase participant anxiety.  While participants received these 
instructions and prepared their speeches, the experimenter observed their behavior via the 
camera feed in the other room. 
 Experimental manipulation.  The next set of instructions in the survey explained that 
participants would complete another task before giving their speeches.  They were randomly 
assigned to one of four conditions.  The survey software randomly assigned participants to 
groups without experimenter knowledge.  Excluding those participants eliminated for procedural 
errors, the genuine laughter group consisted of 25 participants, the forced laughter group 
consisted of 23 participants, the relaxation group consisted of 32 participants, and the control 
group consisted of 25 participants. 
In the genuine laughter condition, participants were told that they would watch a brief 
video clip and should allow themselves to fully experience whatever emotions they had during 
the clip and respond naturally.  Then they advanced the survey to a video clip, which was a 
shortened version of the Skype Laughter Chain video found on YouTube, which contains footage 
of people of all ages laughing in reaction to others’ laughter, some with rather odd or 
uncontrollable laughs.  This stimulus produced laughter in individual participants in a previous 
study.  According to a manipulation check at the end of the survey, 58.3% of participants in this 
condition reported genuine laughter during this video clip. 
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 In the forced laughter condition, participants received a similar set of instructions, but 
they were told that during the video clip they were going to mimic the sound of the 
experimenter’s voice.  A recording of the experimenter repeating the syllable “HA” at random 
intervals was inserted into the video clip viewed in the genuine laughter condition, with the 
original sound removed.  This was done to mimic the physical movements of natural laughter 
without inducing positive emotion.  34.8% of participants self-reported producing at least one 
genuine laugh during the video clip. 
 In the relaxation condition, participants were instructed that they would be watching a 
video clip during which they were instructed to “relax and clear your mind.”  Participants then 
viewed a video that was a slideshow of various sunset pictures, with a light piano melody 
playing in the background.  In this condition, as in all the above conditions, the video clip was 
two minutes long. 
 In the control condition, participants were simply instructed to sit quietly and wait for 
further instructions.  These participants did not view a video and simply sat with two minutes of 
silence playing on their headphones.  This condition was created to control for any physiological 
or anxiety state changes that might occur simply with the passage of time after the anxiety-
inducing speech task.  After two minutes had passed, participants were instructed to return to the 
survey and continue. 
Stroop task.  The modified emotional Stroop task is used to evaluate attentional biases 
toward different kinds of threat in anxiety disorders (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985).  Using the 
Stroop task measures residual anxiety in an implicit manner, and thus could result in data that is 
potentially more accurate than self-report data.  In a comparison of generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) with social phobia using this task, one study found that although patients with GAD were 
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slowed by all emotionally-related words, patients with social phobia were only distracted by 
words related to giving a speech (Becker, Rinck, Margraf, & Roth, 2001).  In the above study, 
the authors found no main effect for different types of words (positive, negative, GAD-related, or 
speech-related) among their non-anxious control group.  However, the modified Stroop task in 
this study was administered at a baseline level.  In this study, participants are asked to give and 
prepare a speech before completing the modified Stroop task, in order to detect an increased 
attentional bias toward speech-related words due to the effect of priming.  Although participants 
in this study were not clinically anxious, a non-anxious group might show a significant 
attentional bias toward speech-related words, due to the prevalence of the fear of public speaking 
in the general population. 
To access the Stroop task, participants in this study were instructed to open a webpage 
containing an Inquisit software script with instructions for a modified Stroop task.  They were 
told to identify the colors of words as quickly as possible without trying to read the content of the 
word.  After a practice round, where all stimuli were color words, the experimental round began, 
which contained a set of 12 words that evoked positive emotions and 12 words related to social 
anxiety (see Mathews & MacLeod, 1985 for stimuli).  The task was programmed so that words 
were randomly presented and their order differed for each participant.  Two participants’ data 
were eliminated because they did not follow directions and completed the Stroop task using only 
one hand, instead of two as instructed, for a total of 103 participants with usable data.   
 Speech performance.  Next, participants were instructed to give their prepared speech.  
Participants were reminded that their performance would be videotaped and evaluated.  
Participants remained seated and spoke toward the camera.  After participants were told to begin, 
the audio file contained five minutes of silence, after which participants were told that their 
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speech was over, and they should return to the survey.  Participants could speak for the entire 
time if they chose, but some participants did not speak for the entire five minutes and either 
forcibly advanced the survey without completing the audio file or sat quietly until instructed to 
continue. 
 Manipulation check and demographic information.  Participants answered a final set 
of questions evaluating their own performance on the speech and their thoughts related to the 
speech.  Several questions were implemented as a manipulation check, asking how important the 
speech was to them.  Participants then answered basic demographic questions and completed the 
survey.  Once the survey was completed, the experimenter stopped video and physiological data 
recording.  Participants were debriefed, and the experimenter removed all equipment. 
Measures 
 Trait anxiety.  The trait portion of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-T, Form Y; 
Spielberger, 1983) was used to assess trait anxiety characteristics of participants.  The STAI-T 
(Form Y) contains 20 questions that measure participants’ trait anxiety.  Sample items include “I 
worry too much over something that really doesn’t matter” and “I am a steady person.”  
Participants indicate how they generally feel on a Likert Scale from 1 (almost never) to 4 (almost 
always).  Higher scores mean that the participant is more anxious.  Test-retest reliability for the 
STAI-T ranges from .65 to .75 over a 2-month interval, and internal consistency coefficients 
range from .86 to .95 (Spielberger, 1983).  In this study, the STAI-T had an internal consistency 
of α = .90. 
 Personality.  The Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003) measures basic personality dimensions.  The TIPI is a set of 10 items, each consisting of 
one pair of traits.  Sample items include “anxious, easily upset” and “sympathetic, warm.”  
LAUGHTER AND ANXIETY  15 
Participants rate whether the traits apply to them on a Likert scale from 1 (disagree strongly) to 7 
(agree strongly).  Items 1 and 6 assess Extraversion, Items 2 and 7 assess Agreeableness, Items 3 
and 8 assess Conscientiousness, Items 4 and 9 assess Emotional Stability, and Items 5 and 10 
assess Openness to Experiences.  Items 2, 4, 6, 8, and 10 are reverse-scored.  Scores for each of 
the five traits are averaged, so that each trait has a possible score of 1 to 7.  In the initial study, 
the TIPI had a test-retest reliability of .72 after six weeks (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). 
 State anxiety.  State anxiety was measured at three time points: baseline (after baseline 
physiological measurements had been taken for a five-minute period, to allow participants time 
to adjust to the equipment and laboratory setting), post-induction (after the initial anxiety-
inducing task, in which they prepared their speech), and post-intervention (upon completion of 
the video for the genuine laughter, forced laughter, and relaxation groups, and after the audio file 
finished for the control group).  Participants rated their current anxiety levels on a sliding scale 
of 0 to 10, from “not at all” to “very much” based on three questions (“I feel anxious;” I feel 
worried;” “I feel stressed”).  Total anxiety score was computed by adding the three scales 
together, for a total anxiety score ranging from 0 (no anxiety) to 30 (maximum anxiety).  Internal 
consistency for baseline, post-induction, and post-intervention measures was high, at α = .86, 
.89, and .90, respectively. 
 Manipulation and engagement checks.  After the experimental manipulation, 
participants answered several questions as a manipulation and engagement check.  Participants 
who had viewed a video (the genuine laughter, forced laughter, and relaxation groups) were 
asked to rate the emotions evoked by the video they had previously viewed.  They rated 8 
emotions (interest, amusement, anger, contentment, disgust, fear, sadness, and surprise) based on 
how much they experienced each one during the video, from a scale of 0 (none) to 8 (most in my 
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life).  Participants also rated the importance of the speech and their focus during the speech from 
a scale of 1 to 5. 
 Cognitive measures.  After giving their speeches, participants were asked to describe the 
overall quality of their speech on a Likert scale from 1 (horrible) to 6 (almost perfect).  Their 
confidence during the speech was also assessed on a Likert scale from 1 (not at all confident) to 
5 (completely confident).  Finally, participants were asked how frequently they thought about 
their speech during other portions of the experiment, and to what extent their thoughts were 
negative and positive (0 = not at all; 10 = extremely).  They then described their most negative 
thought and most positive thought in an open-ended format. 
Results 
Trait Differences 
 Across the four conditions, most of the measures of trait characteristics showed no 
significant differences.  For the STAI score, M = 40.39 and SD = 8.23 on a scale from 20 to 80; 
participants had low to moderate trait anxiety on average, as expected for a non-clinical sample.  
Personality traits, measured using the TIPI on a scale from 2 to 14, had similar means.  For 
extraversion, M = 9.28, SD = 2.92; agreeableness M = 10.24, SD = 2.25; conscientiousness M = 
11.16, SD = 2.28; emotional stability M = 9.69, SD = 2.54; and openness M = 10.38, SD = 2.09. 
After running a one-way ANOVA, it was determined that ratings of openness, measured 
using the TIPI, differed significantly across groups, F (104) = 4.01, p =.02.  Openness differed 
significantly between the forced laughter group and the control group, p = .02, and there was a 
marginally significant difference between the genuine laughter and forced laughter groups, p = 
.06.  In addition, emotional stability was marginally significantly different between the relaxation 
group and the control group, p = .05.  Because openness and emotional stability showed 
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significant group differences, they were controlled for in the primary analyses.  No other traits 
showed significant differences across groups. 
Correlations were calculated between the various trait measures and the primary measure 
of anxiety, self-reported anxiety at baseline, post-anxiety induction, and post-intervention (Table 
1).  STAI scores were the most strongly correlated of the trait measures and thus deserved further 
examination.  A hierarchical regression analysis showed a small but significant amount of the 
variability in each of these anxiety measures was accounted for by STAI score on post-
intervention anxiety, the main state anxiety variable of interest, R² = .13, p < .001.  Adding in 
condition as a second level predictor did not significantly change the model, ΔR² = .001, p = .78.  
Because there were no group differences among STAI scores, they were not examined further. 
Effectiveness of Emotion Induction 
 Speech task.  Overall, the speech task was an effective inducer of anxiety, as measured 
by self-reported state anxiety levels at baseline, post-anxiety induction, and post-intervention.  At 
baseline, participants had a state anxiety level M = 7.01, SD = 6.37.  After the anxiety induction, 
participants had a state anxiety level M = 11.29, SD = 6.68.  After the intervention, participants 
had a state anxiety level M = 7.55, SD = 6.14.  Mean difference between baseline anxiety and 
post-induction anxiety was significant, t (103) = -6.83, p < .001.  Mean difference between post-
induction anxiety and post-intervention anxiety was significant, t (102) = 5.69, p < .001.  Mean 
difference between baseline anxiety and post-intervention anxiety was not significant, t (102) = -
.87, p = .39.  Since post-intervention levels of anxiety did not significantly differ from baseline 
levels, on average participants returned to the same levels of anxiety at the end of measurement. 
 Videos.  Experienced emotions were compared across the three video conditions and one 
control condition.  A one-way ANOVA was used to determine significance between groups, and 
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Tukey’s HSD was used to determine the direction of significance.  There were no significant 
differences across groups for anger (M = 1.51, SD = 1.12), disgust (M = 1.44, SD = 1.03), fear 
(M = 1.64, SD = 1.39), or sadness (M = 1.42, SD = .98), as these emotions were not targeted by 
the videos.  There was also no significant difference across the groups for contentment (M = 
3.84, SD = 2.13), even though the control condition and forced laughter condition were not 
designed to elicit positive emotions, unlike the genuine laughter and relaxation conditions.  
There were significant mean differences in ratings of interest, amusement, and surprise (Table 2).  
For interest, amusement, and surprise, respectively, F (103) = 3.99, p = .01; F (103) = 7.61, p < 
.001; F (103) = 5.01, p = .003.  Participants rated the video in the genuine laughter condition as 
significantly more interesting than the video in the relaxation condition, p = .01, and marginally 
more interesting than the video in the forced laughter condition, p = .08, and the control 
condition, p = .05.  The video in genuine laughter condition was rated significantly more 
amusing than the video in the relaxation condition, p = .001, and the control condition, p < .001, 
but not significantly more amusing than the video in the forced laughter condition, p = .135.  
Finally, the video in the genuine laughter condition was rated as significantly more surprising 
than the videos in the forced laughter group, p = .03, and the relaxation group, p = .002. 
 Engagement check.  Participants were asked to evaluate how focused they were while 
giving the speech and how important the speech was to them in order to test for levels of 
participant engagement.  Participants who did not give a speech were eliminated from this 
analysis, leaving valid data from 91 participants.
1
  For focus and importance, participants fell 
around the midpoint of the 5-point scales, M = 2.59, SD = 1 and M = 3.36, SD = 1.05, 
respectively.  Across all four groups, no significant differences were found in levels of focus, F 
(90) = .32, p = .81, and importance, F (90) = .35, p = .79. 
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Subjective Experience 
 Speech measures.  Participants rated their confidence on the speech around the midpoint 
of the 5-point scale, M = 2.25, SD = 1.05.  Ratings for overall quality were somewhat below the 
midpoint of the 6-point scale, M = 2.36, SD = .91.  Participants showed no significant differences 
across groups in self-reported ratings of their level of confidence before the speech, F (90) = .64, 
p = .59, and the overall quality of their speech, F (90) = 2.01, p = .12. 
State anxiety.  Significance of differences in anxiety measures across conditions was 
calculated using a hierarchical regression model.  Post-intervention anxiety was used as the 
gauge of the effectiveness of a condition on anxiety, as this anxiety score was conducted directly 
after the intervention was given.  Baseline anxiety was significantly correlated with post-
intervention anxiety, r = .695, p < .001; post-induction anxiety was also significantly correlated 
with post-intervention anxiety, r = .847, p < .001.  A hierarchical regression analysis was 
conducted to determine if post-intervention anxiety could be significantly accounted for by 
condition, above and beyond ratings of baseline anxiety and post-induction anxiety.  Group 
differences for openness and emotional stability were also taken into account in the regression 
analysis.  Post-intervention anxiety was predicted by baseline anxiety, post-induction anxiety, 
openness, and emotional stability, R² = .75, F (101) = 71.63, p < .001.  When condition was used 
as a second-level predictor in the model, ΔR² < .001, ΔF (101) = .04, p = .83; thus, condition did 
not significantly influence post-intervention anxiety levels. 
This analysis was also repeated after removing outliers, data where reported anxiety at 
baseline, post-induction, and post-intervention were greater than two standard deviations from 
the mean (Table 3).  Without outliers, post-intervention anxiety was predicted by baseline 
anxiety, post-induction anxiety, openness, and emotional stability, R² = .64, F (93) = 39.54, p < 
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.001.  When condition was used as a second-level predictor in the model, ΔR² = .002, ΔF (93) = 
.39, p = .53; again, condition did not significantly influence post-intervention anxiety levels.   
Cognitive Measures 
 Implicit.  The emotional Stroop test was used as an implicit cognitive measure of 
residual anxiety post-intervention.  Mean latency, the average time to correctly name the word 
after it appeared on screen, was calculated for all control words (positively valenced, non-threat 
words) and for all correct social threat words (Figure 1).  A repeated measures ANOVA was 
used to examine the effect of group on the latency of the two categories of words.
2
  The main 
effect of condition on latency was not significant, F (1) = .29, p = .59.  There was a marginally 
significant interaction between word category and group for differences in mean latency between 
the control words and social threat words, F (3) = 2.22, p = .09.  The genuine and forced laughter 
groups showed higher mean latencies for control words than social threat words, while the 
relaxation and control groups showed higher mean latencies for social threat words than control 
words (Figure 2).  When a planned comparison test was conducted comparing only the genuine 
laughter group and the control group and excluding participants in the other two conditions, there 
was a significant difference in the mean difference of social threat and control word latencies, t 
(24) = 3.10, p = .005 (Figure 3).  Based on an observation of the pattern of group means, it 
appears that participants in the genuine laughter group had faster reaction times for social threat 
words than control words, meaning they did not show an attentional bias toward social threat 
words; the opposite was found for the control group. 
 Explicit.  Participants were also asked to rate their speech-related thoughts as an explicit 
measure of cognitions.  Participants who did not give a speech were excluded from this analysis, 
leaving data from 91 participants (Table 4).  There were no significant differences between the 
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conditions in the amount of thoughts related to the speech during the intervention period, F (90) 
= 1.32, p = .27.  Participants also did not have significantly more positive thoughts about the 
speech in any condition, F (82) = .85, p = .47.  However, participants did experience a significant 
difference in the degree of negative thoughts about the speech, F (81) = 2.86, p = .04.  A post-
hoc test (Tukey’s HSD) was conducted to determine the direction of this effect.  The genuine 
laughter group had marginally less negative thoughts than the forced laughter group, p = .07, and 
the control group, p = .09, but not significantly less negative thoughts than the relaxation group, 
p = .65. 
Participants were asked after giving their speech to describe their thoughts about the 
speech.  However, they were asked to describe the thoughts they had during the intervention, not 
during the speech.  Because participants were not told that they would not have to give the 
speech until after the intervention, they were most likely still having the same thoughts during 
the intervention regarding the speech as others who did ultimately give a speech.  Therefore, data 
collected regarding thoughts about the speech could still be valid even for participants who did 
not ultimately give a speech.  Under this premise, the analysis was repeated to include 
participants who had not given the speech (Table 5).  Group differences for the frequency of 
speech thoughts were marginally significant, F (101) = 2.34, p = .08.  There were still no 
significant differences between groups for the extent of positive thoughts, F (92) = .70, p = .56.  
Group differences for the extent of negative thoughts remained significant, F (90) = 4.10, p = 
.009.  The genuine laughter group had significantly less negative thoughts than the forced 
laughter group, p = .02, and the control group, p = .04, but not significantly less negative 
thoughts than the relaxation group, p = .69. 
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Discussion 
 Although laughter does not appear to have any effects on self-reported levels of anxiety 
in distressing situations, it does appear to affect cognitions.  People who laughed after being 
presented with a stressful task reported less negative thoughts regarding the stressor than those 
who did not, though not more so than those in another positive emotion condition, relaxation.  
They were also not distracted by the social threat cue and were able to name the color of the 
word in the Stroop task more quickly compared to the control condition, which shows less 
attentional bias toward threats after laughter.  Again, this difference only existed between the 
genuine laughter condition and the control condition. 
 Because laughter did not decrease the frequency of thoughts about a stressor, the 
hypothesis that laughter distances a person from psychological distress is not supported.  
However, laughter differed significantly from the control condition for the measure of attentional 
bias, while relaxation, the other positive emotion, did not.  Therefore, there may still be an added 
benefit of laughter that goes beyond that of other positive emotions.  Laughter appears to 
function similarly to other positive emotions in acting as a buffer from negative cognitions.  
Because less attention is directed toward threat during laughter, more cognitive resources are 
available, which allows for more flexible thinking.  This conclusion supports the broadening 
component of the broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions.  People who experience a 
positive emotion do not dwell on the negative aspects of a stressful situation and are able to think 
more flexibly, although not necessarily more positively.  These people are also less distracted by 
cues that appear threatening, and instead pay attention to more positive stimuli.  In this study, the 
effect of the broaden-and-build theory on anxiety is emphasized. 
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Laughter has an effect on the cognitive measures of anxiety, both implicit and explicit, 
but not on direct measures of anxiety.  Why might this be?  Self-report data is often unreliable, 
and many people have difficulty recognizing and differentiating their emotions.  Perhaps 
participants did not want to appear anxious due to social pressure, and thus they reported lower 
levels of anxiety than they actually experienced.  They might have also anticipated the study 
aims and responded as they thought they should, with their anxiety lessening even after no 
intervention.  Participants were also not directed to think about anything in particular in the 
control condition, so there might be great variability in the kinds of thoughts participants had.  
Some participants might have had a more optimistic outlook or a stronger ability to regulate their 
emotions than expected, meaning they returned to baseline anxiety faster than anticipated. 
 Another explanation for this outcome is that laughter might affect anxiety, but on a 
smaller emotional scale or only at a pre-conscious level.  Perhaps laughter only has a cognitive, 
but not a phenomenological, effect.  Examining physiological data in the future will help us 
solve the mystery.  If participants did not differ on their physiological responses across 
conditions, this would be a good indicator that positive emotions and/or laughter only have a 
cognitive effect.  If differences are found between the laughter and relaxation conditions and the 
control condition, further support for Fredrickson’s undoing hypothesis of positive emotions 
exists – that positive emotions can “undo” the cardiovascular effects of negative emotions, such 
as anxiety, by returning heart rate and blood pressure to pre-anxious levels (Fredrickson, 
Mancuso, Branigan, & Tugade, 2000; Fredrickson & Levenson, 1998).  If the laughter group 
experiences a faster return to baseline physiology than all other groups, including relaxation, we 
can conclude that laughter has an additional physiological effect that extends beyond the undoing 
hypothesis of positive emotions; we could also conclude that self-reported measures of anxiety 
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are less reliable than physiological measures of anxiety, and self-report measures simply failed to 
pick up the effect of laughter on anxiety in this study. 
 Future studies might find better methods to test the differences between genuine and 
forced laughter and between laughter and other positive emotions.  Many participants in the 
forced laughter condition reported instances of genuine laughter during their intervention, 
although this has not been confirmed with video coding at this time.  There are not any existing 
paradigms that differentiate between “real” and “fake” laughter in an experimental manner, 
which are needed to explore the differences between the two, if they exist.  A better relaxation 
condition could also be used, perhaps with a mindfulness meditation instead of simple relaxation.  
A few participants self-reported laughter during the relaxation intervention, perhaps because they 
found it cheesy.  Again, this has yet to be video coded.  Additional positive emotion states could 
be added into the experimental protocol for a more complete comparison of the effects of 
positive emotions on anxiety. 
 The data collected in this study are plentiful, and there is great opportunity for future 
research in the fields of positive emotions, anxiety interventions, and even in this data set.  Along 
with physiological data, behavioral data can be examined.  Participants’ speeches can be coded 
for laughter, smiling, and overall quality, which would inform questions about laughter’s effect 
on performance in stressful situations, not just on the experience of distress itself.  This study 
could be repeated with more participants or with more rigorous tests of laughter, without relying 
as much on self-report data, to confirm the cognitive effects of laughter and possibly discover 
physiological and behavioral effects as well. 
Although there is more work to be done, this study was able to discover that laughter 
does affect cognitive aspects of anxiety, which was previously untested in an experimental 
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design.  Replication of these results and further examination of the data set would open up areas 
for future study, including an examination of laughter and other positive emotions in those who 
are clinically anxious.  Because the anxiety disorders are characterized by cognitive biases 
toward threat, and laughter seems to supersede these effects, laughter might be used in a 
treatment for anxiety as a way to disrupt a cycle of ruminative thinking and distract from biases 
toward threat.  Future experimental studies with a clinically anxious population, and later 
treatment studies, are promising continuations of research on laughter and anxiety, which until 
now were unexplored.  
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Footnotes 
1
 Participants in the first 15 trials of experiment did not give speeches, as this part of the 
experiment was not yet approved by the IRB.  Other participants simply did not follow the 
instruction to give a speech. 
 
2
 Openness and Emotional Stability were analyzed as covariates in this model to account 
for group differences.  However, their effects were not significant: for openness, F = .46, p = .50; 
for emotional stability, F = .005, p = .94.  Because controlling for openness and emotional 
stability in the primary analyses did not alter conclusions about the results, they will not be 
discussed further.  
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Table 1 
Trait and State Anxiety Correlations 
Anxiety STAI Extraversion Agreeableness Conscientiousness 
Emotional 
Stability 
Openness 
Baseline .38** -.01 -.13 -.06 -.32** .06 
Post-induction .30** -.02 .04 -.01 -.23* -.10 
Post-intervention .36** -.05 .03 .01 -.18 -.04 
 
*p < .05, **p < .01 
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Table 2 
Experienced Emotions by Condition (Significant Differences Only) 
 
Emotion 
Genuine Laughter Forced Laughter Relaxation Control 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Interest 5.20 (1.94) 3.74 (2.01) 3.41 (1.86) 3.67 (2.50) 
Amusement 5.96 (1.77) 4.70 (2.29) 3.84 (1.63) 3.50 (2.38) 
Surprise 3.88 (2.09) 2.35 (1.70) 2.03 (1.62) 2.67 (2.06) 
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Table 3 
Self-Reported Anxiety by Condition (Outliers Removed) 
 
Anxiety 
Genuine Laughter Forced Laughter Relaxation Control 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Baseline 5.52 (4.70) 6.53 (4.22) 5.90 (4.20) 4.26 (3.39) 
Post-induction 9.22 (6.42) 11.21 (4.09) 10.10 (5.98) 10.26 (5.28) 
Post-intervention 5.43 (4.91) 7.37 (4.88) 6.38 (4.58) 6.52 (4.31) 
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Table 4 
Speech-Related Thoughts by Condition (Only Participants Who Gave Speech) 
 
Speech Thoughts 
Genuine Laughter Forced Laughter Relaxation Control 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Frequency 2.64 (1.05) 2.33 (0.84) 2.82 (1.06) 2.91 (1.00) 
Positive 6.15 (2.56) 5.93 (2.76) 4.92 (2.82) 5.74 (2.93) 
Negative 3.40 (2.21) 5.47 (2.20) 4.25 (2.31) 5.17 (2.81) 
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Table 5 
Speech-Related Thoughts by Condition (All Participants without Procedural Errors) 
 
Speech Thoughts 
Genuine Laughter Forced Laughter Relaxation Control 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Frequency 2.63 (1.01) 2.23 (0.97) 2.94 (1.15) 2.88 (0.97) 
Positive 6.22 (2.50) 5.75 (2.77) 5.14 (2.74) 5.76 (2.82) 
Negative 3.32 (2.17) 5.75 (2.41) 4.14 (2.26) 5.24 (2.83) 
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Figure 1 
Stroop Latency by Word Category and Condition 
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Figure 2 
Interaction of Word Category and Condition
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Figure 3 
Difference Latency (Social Threat Latency – Control Latency) by Condition 
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